Tuesday, 9 July 2013

When Government refuses to answer questions

Context

This post is a rejoinder to my "Public Participation in Strategy-making"  published on 24 January 2013.  It exposed serious flaws in the efforts of the Northern Ireland Government's lead Department, the Office of First and Deputy First Ministers (OFMDFM), and also that of the Department for Social Development (DSD) to draft strategy.

That January post, like this one, forms one part of my blog series entitled "Northern Ireland's Strategy Scandal."

My January post summarised the detailed comments I had submitted to OFMDFM and to DSD on their draft strategies published for public consultation.
In essence, I discovered that both draft strategies were defective in terms of content and were also dreadfully presented.

The OFMDFM's document purported to address the issue of community relations; the DSD's to address the related area of urban regeneration and community development.

This new post discusses some issues arising from the DSD's attempt to finalise its strategy which has been published on 2 July 2013.

Representation

My representation to DSD in October 2012 had excoriated its draft strategy as deficient in content.  I provided a paragraph by paragraph critique to prove the point beyond any doubt.

The submission added that the consultation report's message was lost because of the document’s prolixity, bad presentation, and failure to articulate a coherent message.  
It argued that DSD ignored the OFMDFM’s red book on policy-making.  

I suggested that the draft strategy comes across as having been composed as a mechanistic exercise, lacking creative thought and bereft of innovation, never mind radical purpose.  
My critique provided examples from the draft document to prove each of my points.

My representation argued that DSD cannot justify describing the document as a policy framework.  Neither can it even be described as a strategy because it concentrates on process and sets out no vision.   
I pointed out that it proposes no explicit new direction or rationale for a change of policy.  
In 22 pages, all that the DSD's draft offers is a vague promise to assess existing policies and to develop new ones.  


The DSD could do better, I suggested.

Questions

My representation last October closed by asking DSD to respond to my submission point by point and answer the following questions.

  • Who composed the “Urban Regeneration and Community Development Framework 2012?”
  • Was it written by a nominated official or was it a collaborative production by a number of people within the DSD?
  • What are the qualifications and expertise of the document’s author or authors?  Was she, he, or were they, for example, sociologists, town planners, economists, community development professionals, administrative civil servants, or does the authorship have some other set of qualifications and skills? If so, what are they?
  • Why is the document published anonymously with no reference to the staff who may have been involved in its composition?
  • Who had the final say, like an editor in chief, of the document that was eventually finalised for publication?
  • Was the document written by a private consultant or by some other advisor to DSD?  If so, what were the qualifications and skills of that person or team?  
  • It is an odd omission that the date of the document’s publication appears neither on the cover nor on the opening or closing pages of text.  What is the reason for publishing a policy framework without a publication date?  
  • On what background advice, reports, statistical data, or other evidence, is the report based?  
  • Why is the term “Policy Framework” used rather than, say, Policy, Strategy, Guidelines, or Action Plan? 
  • Apart from publishing the document and its mailing to selected bodies, what other attempts are being made by DSD to promote participation with members of the public? 
  • What weight will be afforded to public comments received to the DSD’s consultation document; and how exactly are they going to be taken into account? 
  • At what staffing level will this representation be read and considered?

I posed these questions for two reasons.

The first was to seek important information, absent from the document, and which might provide more robust explanation of the qualitative and quantative purposes and methodology of the DSD in drafting its strategy. 

My thinking is that the best policy, or solution to a problem, is achieved through a process of thesis, anthithesis, and synthesis. Cross-examination and debate can help refine, alter and improve or change policy elements.

My other reason was to set the DSD a test to ascertain how seriously and at what level representations are considered. A failure to respond would imply that my full submission might not have been read; and if questions can be ignored, then so too might be my point-by-point critique.

In the absence of a response after almost eight months, I decided to contact the Permanent Secretary, the Department's head civil servant. 

Recent correspondence

On 4 June 2013, I wrote and posted a letter to the DSD's Permanent Secretary.

I referred  him to my detailed response of October to his 22-page public consultation document “Urban Regeneration and Community Development Framework 2012.”

My 8-page representation had included constructive comments as well as questions within the text. That analysis together with its series of closing questions matter, and all of which I had expected to be answered.

Apart from an acknowledgement emailed to me on 23 October by an unnamed person in the urban policy review branch, I had received no communication about the strategy from DSD in the intervening period of over seven months.

I opined in my letter that because public representation in public policy-making is an important part of the democratic process, it behoves policy makers and advisors to reciprocate.   
This, I suggested, has the additional benefit of ensuring that citizens’ comments are heard and shown to be taken into account before policy is finalised.

I invited the Permanent Secretary, as politely as I could, to provide me with a reply to the questions posed in my representation.

Four weeks later, on 2 July 2013 I received a reply signed by the Permanent Secretary himself. On the same day, I acknowledged receipt of his letter via email to his personal assistant. 

I did so promptly as a courtesy and also because his reply had emphasised that 
"we do not normally respond to individuals.  We do not have the resources."  

I am honoured and grateful, therefore, to receive exceptional consideration.
I am also flattered by his closing comment thanking me for coming back to him, that my argument has been taken seriously, and that my interest is welcomed.

Coincidentally, on the same day (and less than an hour after I received the Permanent Secretary's letter), I also received a notification by email from the DSD Urban Policy Branch advising me that the final strategy was now being published that day.

The message added that :-
"The Framework can be viewed at"

The Permanent Secretary's reply goes a little way to respond to some of my questions  insofaras it summarises the process of strategy-drafting by the Department, and its support from academics and other external experts.  
Crucially, he adds that 

"the drafting of the consultation document was taken forward by DSD officials." 

Consideration of reply

If the draft strategy was indeed as thoroughly informed with expertise and evidence as the Permanent Secretary says, I am now at an even greater loss to comprehend how the DSD officials managed to produce such an abysmal document for consultation with the public.  
How the Permanent Secretary and the Minister authorised its publication, given the flaws which I highlighted in my submission, remains a mystery.

I am disappointed that DSD refuses to engage with individuals because of an alleged paucity of resources.  
The draft strategy in question provoked a mere 72 responses, a very low return. 
I have, therefore, to take issue with the Permanent Secretary's description of the responses as "a significant number."  
It is 4 times less that the OFMDFM received for its draft community relations strategy. That number was itself (288 replies) very small compared to the much higher numbers who responded to consultation documents by other Departments in recent years.

A striking and paradoxical feature is that of all Departments which comprise the administration in Northern Ireland, DSD should be the most proficient at consultation. 
It, after all, is tasked with engaging with communities, something that is central to its mission, developing policies and action plans for community development and regeneration "from the bottom up."  

Its officials could reasonably be expected, therefore, to have substantial experience and skill in the role of community engagement. If that ability were to be measured against the community's responsiveness to its key consultation document on community development and regeneration, the resultant score must have (at least privately) disappointed the top officials in the DSD - whatever the line the Permanent Secretary takes with people like me.

Moreover, I suspect that not all of the 72 respondents asked questions requiring a response. In which case, the scale of task in having to respond to individuals will be even less.

To illustrate the contrast in attitude, when OFMDFM failed to pick up on the questions raised in my representation to the community relations strategy, its Permanent Secretary apologised for the oversight and addressed some of my questions when I brought the issue to his attention.

Refusal by DSD to answer questions and to respond to constructive debate defeats the purpose of the exercise of making public consultation meaningful. The Department's stance inexplicably passes up what it should recognise as the ideal opportunity presented by my questioning to rebut my argument and to justify its own policy. 

The DSD's rationale for refusing to engage, therefore, appears disingenuous for the above reasons. 


Conclusions

The sad thing is that even before I study the new and final strategy - which is not open for public comment - the initial impression is unfavourable, judging by the gibberish pseudo-jargon used by DSD in its announcement on 2 July.  Prizes should be offered to any member of the public who can decipher the code.  It says, transmogrifyingly:

"In addition to the policy objectives and supporting actions a key component of the Policy Framework is the decision to move operational activity both now and after the Reform of Local Government to an outcomes-focused approach which measures impact rather than activities funded or associated outputs."

I close with two observations.  
The first is that the OFMDFM's Red Book on policy-making seems to have been consigned to gather dust on shelves if the language of the announcement and impressions gained from initial perusal of the DSD's final strategy are accurate.

The other and most critical point is that if officials cannot compose comprehensible and coherent policies on important matters, and if elected politicians willingly endorse badly drafted policy, it means that the community of Northern Ireland will not achieve the progress it craves because of the failure of those who are paid to serve the public interest.

Our citizens deserve better. 









Monday, 4 February 2013

Conclusions on First & Deputy First Ministers' commitment to community relations



On 19 December 2012, I wrote to the Permanent Secretary of the Office of First and Deputy First Ministers (the OFMDFM), two weeks after the outbreak of hostile protests against Belfast City Council’s majority vote to revise policy on display of the Union Jack. 
As a follow-up to my 13 page line-by-line critique of his Department’s 2½ year old draft strategy for community relations[1] I expressed astonishment at the lethargy on the part of his Department in finalisation of the strategy.

I added that because the protests besmirch the reputation of everybody who lives in Northern Ireland, a message needs to be broadcast loud and clear that Northern Ireland's British and Irish people can neither afford, accept, nor justify tribal intolerance in our home city or region.   

I urged him to take a more assertive position in advising the two main parties of regional Government.

His brief response restricted itself to reassurances that meetings were taking place and that community relations strategy is receiving the highest level of commitment across the Department.   

Despite being flattered to receive his personal reply but disappointed at his verbal economy, I took up his kind invitation to contact the head of community relations, and wrote to her on 7 January[2].

Her reply emphasised the funding devoted to various community relations programmes - £10m in the current financial year.  
Helpful as this information is as one measure of Government’s work, her reference to spending leaves unanswered what performance indicators OFMDFM uses, if any, to monitor the success or failure of its programmes.   
Without a strategy, perhaps there are no targets.

Encouragingly, she says that the lack of a finalised strategy does not mean that community relations activity is suspended or undervalued.  She does not recognise, however, that the absence of a strategic context for funding schemes is a fatal flaw in the OFMDFM’s stance.

The current approach is piecemeal.   
The programmes promoting reconciliation, funded by the Government and others, including the European Union and the International Fund for Ireland, would be more effective in practice – synergistic - if they were co-ordinated within the framework of a strategy for community relations.

Disappointingly her reply fails to comment on any of my analysis.  
As if to refute my case, she cites Civil Service rules on impartiality.  This is her justification for offering no comment on what she describes as my “political statements and assertions.”   
That accusation is disingenuous.

The Census results and Belfast Telegraph polls quoted in my letter are neither political statements nor are they assertions.  They are quantified facts, impartial statistical data. 
When I illustrate the consequences of a policy vacuum with reference to documented sectarian disturbances I am stating fact, not making political assertions.

The same applies to the press reports quoted from newspapers such as the Times, Observer and Belfast Telegraph providing evidence and describing the impacts of lawlessness on our livelihoods and reputation.  

More recently, the PSNI have provided further data about the costs of policing, while businesses have quantified the scale of worsening damage to the region’s economy.   The evidence base for an overdue policy grows daily.

It’s a privilege to participate in the Government’s process of policy-making.  Feedback helps it legitimise the final strategy.   
For that reason, it galls to have carefully-prepared apolitical analysis dismissed en masse as assertions.  OFMDFM should instead process public representations as part of the evidence base, and complementary to the datasets, case-studies, and expert background advice.

The Community Relations Council (CRC) argues[3] that community activists have become increasingly concerned that, despite politicians’ talk (in code) about a ‘shared future’, no credible process has yet been established to confront sectarianism, or the identity issues which lie at the root of our communal divisions.

A year ago CRC published an “independent monitoring report[4] of Northern Ireland’s journey out of violence.”   
This is an object lesson in the sound use of official statistics with logical analysis and proper prose, a sharp contrast to the OFMDFM’s draft community relations strategy.   
The CRC report collated a wide array of statistics, examined and commented both on policy context (flags and community relations included) as well as on copious datasets.  
OFMDFM could take note that objective analysis of facts, figures, and other evidence does not impugn impartiality.

Civil Servants have a duty to serve the public interest.  That means providing Government with expert advice and research, evidence which they have to assemble and analyse. 
This includes ensuring that policies are coherent and guidelines applied.   
They cannot be impartial to official evidence.  
Neither can any policy ignore quantitative and qualitative evidence based on a specious argument about impartiality.  
In the context of delays and recent violence, to state that OFMDFM is highly committed to finalising its strategy rings hollow.

I am incredulous that OFMDFM officials are not examining the evidence, analysing data that bear on community relations. 
I cannot believe that they are neutral and impassive with no analysis or view of the impact of the protests.

The governing parties have failed for nearly 3 years to agree a strategy for community relations.  The OFMDFM’s officials have difficulty drafting policy and use impartiality as erroneous justification to avoid analysing the problems which necessitate a robust policy response.

With authorities like these forming the body politic, it is no surprise that our beloved region gains a reputation for intolerance and division.   
Abraham Lincoln’s speech of almost biblical proportions - “a house divided against itself cannot stand” - is topical and resonant.   
At a time of austerity in public expenditure and the live debate about the need to rebalance the region’s economy, Northern Ireland’s leaders have to confront the issue of its economic and political sustainability.

The flags issue reminds us of the fragility of community relations in Northern Ireland.  
It is just one symptom of a malaise that threatens to expunge the remarkable progress made during the last 15 years.  

A concerted effort is long overdue to address the issues of hatred, prejudice, sectarianism, non-cohesion, and potential disintegration.  

The spotlight is on the First and Deputy First Ministers to deliver.

©Michael McSorley 2013


[1] “Programme for Cohesion Sharing and Integration Consultation” (CSI) July 2010 Office of First & Deputy First Minister. OFMDFM received 288 replies, listing mine as no. 35.
[2] http://strategyni.blogspot.co.uk/ “An Analysis of the rationale for the Union Jack protest 31 Jan 2013
[3] CRC e-bulletin Issue 44, 1 Feb 2013 Jacqueline Irwin CEO
[4] CRC “Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report No. 1” Paul Nolan Feb 2012